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Board Involvement in Strategy: 
Advancing the Governance 
of Sport Organizations
Lesley Ferkins
AUT University
David Shilbury and Gael McDonald
Deakin University
This study investigated how boards of national sport organizations might enhance 
their strategic capability. Utilizing an action research method and focusing on the case 
of New Zealand Football (soccer), findings established that greater board involvement 
in strategy advanced the board’s ability to perform its strategic function. Further find-
ings determined the importance of shared leadership between the board and the CEO, 
the complex interplay in balancing this relationship and the need to integrate strategy 
into board processes.
The term “sport governance” has come to mean the practice of governance 
applied to the sport context (Hoye & Cuskelly, 2007). In essence, sport gover-
nance is the responsibility for the functioning and overall direction of the organi-
zation and is a necessary and institutionalized component of all sport codes from 
club level to national bodies, government agencies, sport service organizations 
and professional teams around the world (Kikulis, 2000). Many scholars in this 
field have taken their lead from more established research domains in seeking to 
determine the efficacy of applying major theoretical constructs to sport organiza-
tions. Consequently, multiple constituency theory, agency theory, stewardship 
theory, managerial hegemony theory, institutional theory, and stakeholder theory, 
for example, have been employed to help explain the sport governance phenom-
enon. Curiously, none as yet has specifically addressed the strategic role of the 
board. Many of the findings from research specific to sport governance (Kikulis, 
2000; Papadimitriou, 1999; Shilbury, 2001), however, have important implica-
tions for an investigation that places strategic development as its central theme.
This study seeks to take another step in our understanding of the topic by 
investigating the strategic capability of national sport organization (NSO) boards. 
NSOs are the agencies responsible for the direction and coordination of a particu-
lar sport code. Typically, members of an NSO are made up of associations located 
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throughout metropolitan and regional New Zealand which in turn are made up of 
local clubs. In most instances, individual players are members of the local club 
rather than the NSO. This study used an action research method with three NSO 
boards which facilitated a level of direct engagement rarely reported in the litera-
ture. Given space limitations and the depth of data garnered through this longitu-
dinal research, results of one of the action research interventions, designed in 
consultation with the board of New Zealand Football (NZF; soccer), are presented 
in this article. Consequently, this paper describes and reports on the use of a rarely 
employed method in governance research with a concomitant level of access to 
board dynamics and specifically, rich qualitative data describing how boards can 
enhance their strategic capability.
Obvious gaps are apparent in the body of empirical knowledge on sport gov-
ernance, specifically as it applies to board strategic capability by virtue of this 
emerging discipline and the small number of active researchers in the field 
(Ferkins, Shilbury, & McDonald, 2005). This lack of academic interest is by no 
means reflective of the intensifying interest from practitioners. Over the last 
decade, for example, both the New Zealand and Australian governments have 
commissioned extensive reviews of the sport and recreation industry in their 
respective countries that have illuminated governance as a central issue for the 
sector. Major findings of the Standing Committee on Recreation and Sport and the 
Ministerial Inquiry in Sport, Fitness and Leisure (Ministerial Taskforce, 2001) 
cited disunity within sports, ineffective governance, lack of shared national lead-
ership, poor communication, a lack of confidence in national and regional struc-
tures by their constituency, duplication of resources and failure to achieve 
economies of scale (Standing Committee on Recreation and Sport, 1997; Ministe-
rial Taskforce, 2001). As well as specifically highlighting governance, the other 
issues cited also ultimately lead back to the governing function.
No studies exist in sport governance on the strategic contribution of board 
members, and leading scholars in sport management have expressed their concern 
at the lack of studies on strategy development in this field (Thibault, Slack, & 
Hinings, 1993; Slack & Parent, 2006). Researchers have, only recently, turned 
their attention to this topic (Auld & Godbey, 1998; Hoye, 2006; Hoye & Cuskelly, 
2003a, 2007; Inglis, 1997a; Kikulis, 2000; Papadimitriou, 1999; Shilbury, 2001). 
As a result, there are a small but growing number of empirical studies that seek to 
address sport governance. In particular, scholars have concentrated on the areas of 
shared leadership, board power and performance, board motivation, board roles, 
and board structure. Some address contemporary issues of practice and some 
signal issues of future concern, but all recognize the multiple theories that impact 
research in this domain.
In engaging theories across multiple domains (corporate, nonprofit, sport 
management), the distinctions between governance issues in the private for-profit 
settings and in public and nonprofit settings have been recognized. A well estab-
lished body of literature on the differences between public sector organizations and 
private sector companies as it pertains to governance explains these distinctions 
(Cornforth, 2003; Miller-Millesen, 2003; Olsen, 2000; Ruigrok, Peck, & Keller, 
2006). According to Shilbury (2001), the key variance can be found in the purpose 
for existence. Financial motivations and the responsibility to create shareholder 
wealth dominate the mission of for-profit organizations. Nonprofit organizations, 
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by contrast, are motivated by a preponderance of goals, are not solely driven by 
financial gain, and instead are charged to protect service-to-mission. Curiously, 
sport occurs in all three settings (public, private for-profit, and private nonprofit) 
with organizations such as national bodies charged with overseeing a mix of pri-
vate for-profit franchises, nonprofit associations and clubs, and interacting with 
public funding agencies. NZF is a nonprofit organization made up of seven regional 
associations, 325 local clubs and 105,000 individual members and it interacts with 
a range of commercial (e.g., Phoenix Football/soccer Franchise) public (e.g., Sport 
and Recreation New Zealand) and nonprofit (e.g., clubs) entities. Not withstanding 
these distinctions, this study of board strategic capability within NSOs is an exten-
sion of existing research and is one of few studies with a singular and in-depth 
focus on strategy in sport organizations.
Theoretical Framework
Three broad and arguably competing theoretical concepts (agency, stewardship, 
and managerial hegemony theory) have been used as a backdrop to this study. In 
addition, the notion of board strategic function, board involvement in strategy and 
shared leadership between the board and CEO have influenced and are influenced 
by the design of this study. These theoretical constructs can be found in empirical 
work spanning the corporate (e.g., Ruigrok et al., 2006), nonprofit (e.g., Brown & 
Iverson, 2004) and sport governance sectors (e.g., Hoye, 2006).
Broad Theoretical Influences
Agency theory is concerned with the internal monitoring issues of governance 
and contributes to an understanding of the power relationships between the CEO 
and board (Stiles, 2001). The theory posits that the primary role of the board is to 
monitor the CEO as an agent who may have different interests than those of the 
owners (board) and therefore must be controlled by the shareholders (Sapienza, 
Korsgaard, Goulet, & Hoogendam, 2000). Stewardship theory, by contrast, con-
siders situations where managers, as stewards, are motivated to act not out of 
self-interest but in the best interests of their principals (Miller-Millesen, 2003). 
Stewardship theory negates the so-called agency costs by assuming that a stew-
ard’s behavior will not depart from the interests of the organization. A steward’s 
behavior is based on co-operation, pro-organizational and collectivistic actions. 
This type of behavior is placed as a higher priority than self-serving behavior 
(Cornforth, 2003). In terms of board involvement in strategy, stewardship theory 
prioritizes a focus on enhancing the performance of the organization rather than 
compliance of the CEO. This focus is enabled because, according to stewardship 
theory, the CEO is motivated by the need for achievement of organization goals 
that should match the owners’ goals (Edwards & Cornforth, 2003). The domina-
tion of agency theory as the primary theory used to understand governance 
dynamics may help explain why empirical work has focused on the compliance 
aspects of governance.
A third major theoretical influence is managerial hegemony. This theory 
asserts that while the board has power by legal right, the real responsibility for the 
organization is assumed by management (Stiles, 2001). Dallas (1996) identified a 
248  Ferkins, Shilbury, and McDonald
number of reasons for this which included the considerable influence manage-
ment has over the selection of board nominees; pressure for conformity; and 
increased opportunity for deeper knowledge of organizational issues. In his dis-
cussion of contrahegemony theory, Dallas (1996) concluded that the theory is 
based on the notions that “management should not have substantial influence over 
the board” (p. 2) and that the board’s most important function is to “ensure that 
management acts in the best interest of shareholders” (p. 2).
Studies in sport management employing the constructs of professionalization 
and bureaucratization of sport organizations strongly indicate there are issues sur-
rounding ownership and control within the sport context (Amis & Slack, 1996; 
Amis, Slack, & Hinings, 2004; Shilbury, 2001; O’Brien & Slack 2004). Shilbury 
(2001) for example, considered that national and state sport organizations have 
been “grappling with the issue of control as volunteer officials have slowly ceded 
control to professionally employed managers” (p. 255). These three broad theo-
ries created a fertile basis from which to investigate how boards of NSOs might 
become more strategic. They signaled the need to consider the power relationship 
between the volunteer board and paid management in strategy design and 
implementation.
Board Strategic Function and Strategy  
in the Corporate Setting
In defining the strategic role of the board within the corporate setting the dominant 
scholarly interpretation fuses strategic function with strategy development (Ingley 
& van der Walt, 2003; Schmidt & Brauer, 2006; Stiles, 2001). Nadler (2004), for 
example, identified four aspects of strategic activity as strategic thinking, strategic 
decision-making, strategic planning, and strategic execution. Gopinath, Siciliano, 
and Murray (1994) considered that when “boards adopt a strategic role, the direc-
tors guide the definition of the corporate mission and are called upon to assist in 
the development, implementation and monitoring of the firm’s strategies” (p. 176). 
In a more recent study, van der Walt and Ingley (2003) considered that the “strate-
gic function of the board involves making critical decisions, particularly in relation 
to strategic changes, so the organization can adapt to environmental changes” 
(p. 17). Clearly, a critical part of board strategic capability is its involvement in 
organization strategy. McNulty and Pettigrew (1999) offered that, “To understand 
strategy, we need to know more about the strategists. To better understand boards, 
we need to know more about the behavior of those who sit on boards” (p. 47). 
Their research on top United Kingdom companies gathered data from interviews 
with 108 company directors and asked how, if at all, do part-time board members 
influence strategy? The findings demonstrated that, contrary to managerial hege-
mony theory, part-time board members play an important role in strategy. Their 
conceptual model represents the levels at which this occurs:
•	 Level	 one	 is	 involvement	 in	 taking	 strategic	 decisions.	 Here,	 influence	 is	
exerted inside the boardroom to either accept or reject proposals presented by 
management. They found that “all boards take strategic decisions” (p. 55).
•	 Level	two	is	involvement	in	shaping	strategic	decisions.	In	this	instance,	influ-
ence occurs early in the decision process as board members are consulted 
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before the proposal is presented and help shape ideas. Some boards are 
involved at this level.
•	 Level	 three	 is	 involvement	 in	shaping	 the	content,	context,	and	conduct	of	
strategy. Here, influence is continuous and not confined to specific proposals 
or decision episodes. The board helps create an environment where strategic 
debate can take place and influences the way management develops strategy 
and what is considered. McNulty and Pettigrew found that a minority of 
boards shape the content, context, and conduct of strategy.
In translating this learning to the sport-related context obvious questions 
arise, such as, to what extent are boards of national sport organizations involved 
in the strategy process? How might greater involvement in strategy enhance the 
board’s strategic capability? How dominant is the CEO and how do boards share 
this leadership role? While no empirical work has been undertaken in the sport 
setting to provide answers to such questions, a small number of authors provide 
guidance from the nonprofit setting.
Strategic Function of the Nonprofit Board
Inglis, Alexander, and Weaver (1999), in studying the roles and responsibilities of 
community nonprofit boards, established empirical support for involvement by 
board members in strategic activities. The authors define “strategic activities” as 
roles relating to planning, setting the mission and vision, policy development, 
evaluating the executive director, and a strong external focus. “Strategic activities 
are future focused with an eye to the external community. They represent the 
broad community context for the organization” (p. 163). The study helps define 
board strategic activity and confirms the importance of a strategic orientation for 
nonprofit boards.
In their assessment of nonprofit boards, Edwards and Cornforth (2003) con-
sidered there to be problems in defining board strategic contribution to an organi-
zation. In particular, the “fuzziness of the boundary between operational detail 
and strategic focus” (p. 78) is problematic. They noted, “It is not only that the two 
can be difficult to distinguish, but our understanding of strategic issues may come 
from exposure to operational detail” (p. 78). In other words, operational detail 
may be an important aspect of strategic decision making and therefore needs to be 
presented in a manner that enhances strategic function. The authors argued that 
“To identify and present to the board what is strategically significant in opera-
tional information, reports and activities requires time, skilled board input and a 
high degree of trust between board members and senior managers” (p. 78).
An outcome of the research conducted by Edwards and Cornforth (2003) 
was the presentation of a model that identifies influences on board strategic out-
puts. Founded on a model from the work of Dulewicz, MacMillan, and Herbert 
(1995), Edwards and Cornforth (2003) considered there to be three categories of 
influences on strategic contribution: context (e.g., institutional influences), inputs 
(e.g., board member skills and experience), and processes (e.g., organizing and 
running the board). This model helps conceptualize what is meant by strategic 
contribution and adds to the theoretical understanding of this topic in the non-
profit sector.
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Shared Leadership in Sport Governance
The final construct used to guide this research was the notion of shared leadership 
between the CEO and board and is drawn from work specifically relating to non-
profit sport organizations (Inglis, 1997a; Shilbury, 2001). In a recent summation 
of the issues regarding the strategic contribution of sport boards, Hoye and 
Cuskelly (2007) considered that at “the heart of the issue for sport organizations 
“seems to be clarifying the respective roles of the board and staff in all strategic 
activities” (p. 117). This statement is consistent with findings from Shilbury 
(2001) on board roles in state sport organizations. He stated that it is not necessar-
ily a negative outcome that there is increasing influence by the CEO. In his study, 
he found that “the executive directors were seeking shared control and leadership 
specifically through their preference for greater influence by the board in the stra-
tegic planning process” (p. 275). Shilbury accurately assessed this “leadership 
paradox” to be an unresolved dilemma facing the governance of sport.
As evidenced by the above discussion, learning relating to the complexities 
of board strategic function traverses the corporate, nonprofit and sport settings. 
There are also clear gaps in our understanding of board strategic capability in each 
of these contexts. This study, guided by existing theoretical constructs, advances 
our understanding of board involvement in strategy and the associated paradoxes 
in the relationship between CEO and board. It offers new learning by engaging in 
a little-used method in governance research, designed to create change in tandem 
with developing knowledge and advancing our understanding of the dynamics of 
sport boards.
Method
This section outlines the method used for the study. It summarizes the choice of 
research sites, the participants involved in the study and the techniques used in 
data generation and analysis. The action research method is explained using four 
primary phases of issue identification, context analysis, intervention and action, 
and evaluation. Finally, issues of validity are discussed and addressed.
Choice of Research Sites and Participants
In qualitative research, purposive sampling is needed to select a case that presents 
an opportunity for intensive study of the phenomena in question (Stake, 2000). 
Stake also considered that while some typicality is useful when selecting a case, 
selection should be primarily based on the potential to learn about the phenomena. 
With this in mind, seven NSO research sites were deliberately selected by the 
research team based on willingness and ability to engage with the action research 
process (Reason & Bradbury, 2001), logistical considerations (e.g., proximity and 
access; Tolich & Davidson, 1999), high experience levels of the phenomena under 
study (Pettigrew, 1990), and evidence of some diversity between NSOs selected.
The researchers determined that it was important that the sites were also con-
sidered case studies. “A qualitative case study is an intensive, holistic description 
and analysis of a single instance, phenomenon, or social unit” (Merriam, 1988, 
p. 21). This encouraged the researchers to consider the research question within a 
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bounded context and integrated system (Miles & Huberman, 1994). Use of the 
case study assisted the researchers to understand the specific context of each NSO 
and therefore what factors might be impacting on the board’s ability to develop its 
strategic capability.
From a list of seven possible sites, three case study organizations were selected. 
This number provided sampling diversity consistent with the above criteria but 
also enabled intensive study by limiting the amount of data collected. As noted 
earlier, due to space limitations and a desire to capture the depth of data associated 
with each case unit, this article reports on the experience of one NSO case study, 
namely New Zealand Football (NZF; soccer). The researchers were not previously 
known to personnel within the NZF and referenced a mutually known colleague to 
initiate discussion, first established with the CEO. The primary research partici-
pants within NZF thereafter consisted of the CEO and seven board members 
including the chairperson. The fieldwork component of the study spanned 18 
months, commencing in July 2005 and concluding in December 2006. The lead 
researcher attended almost all monthly board meetings during this period.
Data Generation and Analysis: Action Research Phases  
and Steps
Action research has been described as both a research method and methodology 
in its own right (Cardno, 2003). The style chosen for this study was drawn from 
the work of Heron and Reason (2001), Cardno (2003), and Coghlan and Brannick 
(2001) and engaged a range of data generation and analysis tools, namely inter-
views, focus groups, document analysis, participant observation, reflective jour-
naling, memorandums, theming, writing and member checking. The lead 
researcher also acted as facilitator in many situations, drawing out data and testing 
and reflecting on conclusions with the research participants. At other times, the 
lead researcher played an observatory role during board meetings, particularly 
toward the end of the fieldwork phase. All focus groups, board meetings and inter-
view situations were video or audio taped, producing a total of seventeen tapes, 
comprising over one thousand one hundred hours of data for NZF. For the pur-
poses of this paper, quotations used from the NZF case study data have been 
coded as “2” followed by the letters ranging between “a-h”. This allows data to be 
cross referenced back to individual participants, demonstrating diligence in the 
data generation and analysis process.
A feature of the data generation and analysis process was its reflexive nature 
where researchers and participants regularly engaged in reflecting on, and analy-
sis of, events that took place. The action research models developed by the authors 
noted above emphasize a cyclical process that allows for refinement and/or deep-
ening in understanding of the issues presented by the research participants. Such 
an approach also contributes to the validity of the research process (Cardno, 2003). 
An amalgam of the three models was developed for the purposes of the current 
study as set out in Figure 1. Four main phases were used for the action research 
process as also noted in Figure 1.
In phase one, Issue Identification, the lead researcher and research partici-
pants came together to explore and agree on a focal area of study. For the current 
study, a broad question derived from the literature review and informal discussion 
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with board members and other governance practitioners, was established by the 
researchers. This was used as the starting point for collaboration in relation to 
designing an appropriate intervention. It was in this phase that the notion of gov-
ernance and the role of the board were explored and the participants’ interpreta-
tion of the concept of “strategic capability” was also teased out.
Phase two, Context Analysis, served as a reconnaissance phase where back-
ground information on the organization and its environment was gathered by the 
researchers to understand the contributing factors that were constraining the board 
in their efforts to “be strategic”. Guided by the literature, those elements that acted 
or might act as barriers and enablers to board strategic capability were also 
explored in a facilitated session by the lead researcher with the research partici-
pants. The types of data that needed to be gathered and how this might occur were 
also further developed by the researchers in consultation with the research partici-
pants and included an emphasis on how different perspectives might be incorpo-
rated into the data set. There were numerous overlaps between phases one and 
two. For this reason and in the interests of space, the two phases have been com-
bined in the results and discussion of this article.
The third phase, Intervention and Action, focused on designing an interven-
tion that might help the board to develop their strategic capability and it was 
Figure 1 — Action research model for developing strategic capability.
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designed in a collaborative manner with the organization. The research partici-
pants’ past experiences as well as theoretical concepts, such as, environmental 
analysis and strategy formulation, introduced by the researchers also informed the 
design of the intervention. In this phase, the planned strategies were put into 
action. An important aspect of phase three was the purposeful monitoring and 
reflection that took place by the researchers and with the research participants to 
inform further action. As depicted in Figure 1, a second intervention and actions 
occurred within the organization.
In the fourth phase, Evaluation of Intervention and Action, the researchers 
and participants critically reflected on the value of the planned action in terms of 
developing the board’s strategic capability with an emphasis on change and learn-
ing. The evaluation was carried out by individually interviewing research partici-
pants. As in phase three, this step was influenced by theoretical concepts as well 
as the experience of the research intervention.
A final component of the action research model developed for this research 
was the inclusion of Coghlan and Brannick’s (2001) concept of meta learning. A 
replication of the mini-cycles of experiencing, reflecting, interpreting, and taking 
action was placed around the outside of the square (see Figure 1), to encourage a 
strategic view of the cycles and phases that took place. This strategic view also 
encompassed consideration in terms of content (what was happening); process 
(how it was happening); and premise (why it was happening). “It is the dynamic 
of this learning cycle that incorporates the learning process of the action research 
cycle and enables action research to be more than everyday problem solving. 
Hence, it is learning about learning, in other words meta learning” (Coghlan & 
Brannick, 2001, p. 19). Figure 1 also illustrates this component of the process.
Issues of Validity
In terms of validity, the aim of this research was to ensure the way data were gath-
ered, analyzed, and presented, reflected the phenomenon under investigation 
(Cardno, 2003), that is, the development of strategic capability in NSO boards. 
Being explicit in all aspects of the research endeavor was another important com-
ponent of validity for this study. Dick (2002) also urges rigor in action research, 
by ensuring that the quality of the data collected and the accuracy of the research 
interpretations are tested by engaging in multiple cycles that challenge original 
conclusions.
These considerations of validity and rigor were addressed on a number of 
levels. The nature of the collaborative approach encouraged continuous involve-
ment by the research participants. In particular, the research participants were 
involved in checking conclusions and written summaries to verify the findings. 
This included regularly checking that the goals of the research were being met as 
well as verifying what was recorded, matched their reality. Another way that the 
validity of the study was protected was through the use of triangulation. In addi-
tion to multiple methods of data collection, information from multiple sources 
was also gathered to generate layers of data. Such sources included official docu-
ments (e.g., annual reports, strategic plans, board minutes), paid full-time CEOs, 
and volunteer board members. This information was used to analyze consistencies 
and inconsistencies in establishing a picture of critical events.
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One of the major criticisms to the validity of qualitative action research is the 
potential for researcher bias. The collaborative nature of the research inquiry cre-
ates the potential for the researcher to unduly exert their values and influence on 
the outcomes of the research (Dick, 2002). While it is the goal of the researcher to 
immerse himself/herself and become actively involved, it is also important to “let 
those being researched ‘speak through’ the researcher in order to gain access to 
the ‘direct experience’ of their world” (Tolich & Davidson, 1999, p. 37). To 
achieve this, the notion of ‘reflexivity’ was used. Hammersley and Atkinson 
(1995) observed that reflexivity allows for social researchers to acknowledge that 
they remain part of the social world they are studying instead of attempting to 
become an objective observer. Reflexivity also encourages the researcher to reflect 
upon and question assumptions and that “researchers must self-consciously reflect 
upon what they did, why they did it, and how they did it” (Tolich & Davidson, 
1999, p. 39).
Reflexivity was achieved in this research by the use of the action cycles, par-
ticularly the mini-cycles that questioned the progress and outcome of each phase, 
as well as the meta learning cycle which encouraged holistic reflection on the 
process. This holistic view considered questions of content, process, and premise. 
As part of this process, the researchers constantly challenged their assumptions, 
conclusions and interpretations, testing the coherence of the emerging outcomes 
against the literature, the participants and each other. This was recorded using 
reflexive journal notes. The reflexive and iterative process of the action research 
cycles facilitates rigor within the research (Reason & Bradbury, 2001). This proj-
ect used two action steps and three layers of reflexivity (including the more struc-
tured evaluation phase).
Results and Discussion
This section summarizes what happened during the four phases of the action 
research process. By integrating relevant literature, it also highlights insights dis-
covered and changes that occurred within the NZF governing setting in relation to 
board strategic function.
Phases One and Two: Issue Identification  
and Context Analysis
At the time the fieldwork commenced, the national office of NZF, located in 
Auckland, New Zealand, employed 15 staff. As noted earlier, there were approxi-
mately 105,000 registered football (soccer) players (female and male), 325 foot-
ball clubs and seven regional associations in a country with a population of 
approximately 4 million. NZF turnover was in excess of $NZ4.4 million. How-
ever, a major issue facing the organization was a lack of financial reserves. The 
board comprised seven members with one additional position co-opted. All seven 
members were nominated and elected by the membership with four of the seven 
subject to an additional nation-wide recruitment process including interviews. 
This model encouraged three positions for the board to be drawn from the regions 
and four “outsiders” recommended by a recruitment panel for their governance 
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skills and independence. In reality, the majority of board members were “close” 
to the game with three former international players and two heavily involved in 
club and/or regional administration of the game before their appointment. One 
member of the board was female, the remaining were male. The CEO, also a male, 
was appointed by the board and was a nonvoting executive at board meetings.
The board members involved in this research were drawn from a range of 
professional backgrounds at senior level including legal, information technology, 
accountancy, teaching and business management. In addition to the three interna-
tional players, two had been on the board since 1999, with the newest member 
joining the board three months earlier. In an e-mail exchange, the CEO described 
his view regarding the board environment. “They are hugely positive, supportive, 
and know where governance stops and management starts – they give me a lot of 
space to run the show (personal communication, 1 August, 2005). In an earlier 
meeting, the CEO also noted he wants to “get more out of the board as there are 
some good people on it” (4 July 2005).
The CEO was appointed just five months before the commencement of this 
research and came into the position from a commercial background in sport spon-
sorship with a major brewing company as well as experience as an athlete and 
manager at Olympic and Commonwealth Games. He was in his late 40s at the 
time of the research. In talking with both the CEO and individual board members, 
the researchers noted a sense of anticipation for the future of the organization and 
a “changing of the guard.” The short time both the CEO and some of the board 
members had been in the job at the start of the research contributed to this obser-
vation as well as a restructuring of the administration and major changes in staff-
ing at the national office. The CEO noted in the annual report: “2005 was very 
much a transitional year, as New Zealand Football positioned itself to move for-
ward positively” (New Zealand Soccer, 2005, p. 4). The task ahead for the board 
would no doubt involve aligning to a new CEO, a new administrative delivery 
structure and new members in its own ranks.
NZF reconnaissance work consisted of five meetings with the CEO and two 
e-mail and telephone exchanges with board members before the first board meet-
ing. A review of NZF documents was also undertaken to establish the environ-
ment within which the study took place. The meetings with the CEO canvassed 
background information on the organization, board function and also sought to 
identify a particular focus for the research relevant to the research question. The 
reconnaissance process also included undertaking a facilitated session at the first 
board meeting attended (26 October 2006). The first step therefore sought to iden-
tify the board’s notion of what “being strategic” is and the second step assessed 
how participants thought the NZF board performed in relation to this notion. The 
lead researcher, most active in the fieldwork phase, acted as a facilitator, used 
mind-mapping techniques on a whiteboard, and video taped the session to aid 
subsequent analysis. A question guide was also prepared providing structure for 
the session.
Identifying a Strategically Capable Board. The participants noted eight dif-
ferent aspects they believed contributed to a strategically capable board. These 
were: a highly focused board; paternalistic; a board that is detached and beholden 
to no one particular faction; has an overview that covers all areas of the business; 
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determines long term goals and provides the roadmap; has the ability to deter-
mine the strategic focus and is able to facilitate the execution (as distinct from 
doing); monitors; and knows where the line is between setting policy and exe-
cuting it. All board members contributed to this list of characteristics and there 
appeared to be general agreement.
When asked how the board distinguishes between governance and opera-
tions, one member responded by stating: “I think there’s a lack of understanding 
about what a board of governance actually is and . . . in football, historically, we 
have not been that clear about it, but now we know what we should and should not 
be doing” (2a). There was agreement from two other longer serving board mem-
bers that historically the board had been too involved in management. One noted: 
“Yes there’s been a shift in the way we work” (2c). Another board member coun-
tered this by stating: “I would also caution that the balance for us is fragile”. He 
went on to say that “in the absence of strategy you force the CEO to act in a cer-
tain way and then you wake up and realize the CEO is calling the shots” (2f). In 
emphasizing the importance of an agreed strategy developed by the board, the 
same board member stated that, “If we have a good strategy we can step back but 
we have some work to do there. We are still getting involved in management 
because we don’t have a well defined strategy” (2f).
The last point related to instances when it is useful to have board members 
offering operational expertise. “A good board has people who can do operational 
functions so you don’t want to isolate the board from doing those functions either and 
you need those skills in sport” (2d). In relation to that point, the same board member 
also stressed that, “As long as the operational work is within the strategic framework 
then being involved operationally doesn’t undermine the strategic focus” (2d).
The same set of questions was asked of the CEO before the facilitated session 
with the board, and the CEO also contributed to the board session on 26 October 
2006. While there was no major difference in perspective between the CEO’s 
responses to the questions and the board’s, the CEO provided an illustration of 
board strategic behavior that proved significant in identifying the issue that became 
an important focus for the NZF case study (23 August 2005):
We were discussing what our response would be . . . both actively in the 
short-term and more subtly in the long-term and one board member said I 
can’t actually make a comment on the validity of the tactical things x (CEO) 
is doing, because I haven’t got a framework. I don’t know what our overall 
objective is. Is our objective to increase participation numbers or is our objec-
tive to win the World Cup? Now they are not necessarily mutually exclusive 
but if our objective was to increase participation numbers, I might have one 
answer to approach this thing. If our objective was to win/make the World 
Cup, I’d have a different answer. I don’t know which it is so it’s hard for me 
to know.
The exploration of what a strategically capable board means to the NZF board 
appeared to fit with generic theoretical concepts of what constitutes “being 
 strategic” (Edwards & Cornforth, 2003). Creating a picture of what a strategically 
capable board might look like, did not appear to be a difficult task for the group 
and it was clear there was consensus among the group regarding the responses. In 
summary, the NZF board captured the core elements of what is currently known 
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about strategic function (Ingley & van der Walt, 2001). This was confirmed when 
the lead researcher provided the group with a summary of points relating to board 
strategic function. As stated by one of the board members: “If we go through the 
handouts, we cover off most bases” (2e, 26 October 2005). Indeed, most of 
the points noted by the board appeared in this description of a strategic board. 
Importantly, both board members and the CEO emphasized the significance of a 
well-defined strategy in enabling the board to maintain a strategic focus. Both 
parties also noted there was progress to be made in that area.
How Are We Doing? In response to questions relating to how board members 
felt they compared with their ideal notion of a strategically capable board, the 
most common theme was that they were heading in the right direction and that 
recent improvements had been made. Several agreed with the sentiment: “I think 
we have started to put the building blocks in place and the next steps will be the 
test” (2e, 26 October 2005). Another member (2c) added that “the test” will also 
be in relation to how they respond to significant changes in their competitive envi-
ronment (for example, Australia’s shift out of the Oceania region into the Asia 
region in terms of the World Cup qualifying process). Another member confirmed 
that they are more conscious of the need to operate strategically and in that regard 
he would rate the board a 7 out of 10 (2f). A further member concurred stating 
that, “I think we are really trying to do the right thing” (2a). Finally, the discussion 
returned to a focus on strategy. “I think we are on the cusp of doing well. We’ve 
got all the great ideas but we need to be 100% confident in our strategy” (2f).
In a separate interview the CEO was asked what might enable a “10 out of 10 
rating”. He noted, “The quality of the strategic plan and making sure that I don’t 
divert it (the meeting) into what I did last month, getting into the detail” (personal 
communication, 23 August 2005). When asked what might get in the way of achiev-
ing a “10 out of 10” rating, the CEO talked about the reporting process. He stated:
Me getting bogged down in detail and wanting their involvement in it albeit 
just through support. I think it happens when CEOs seek recognition for what 
they’re doing. It’s hard when you do a really good job for two months in 20 
different areas and then rock up to a meeting and all they are talking about is 
next year and the year after and you probably think to yourself—hey guys—
I’ve done all these things—you want to tell them all. I think people do it 
through a need for security. (personal communication, 23 August, 2005)
As the above summary of discussion demonstrates, a key premise for NZF 
board members was an awareness of the need to operate strategically and that they 
understood and could articulate the notion of a strategically capable board. In 
comparing themselves to the ideal, they felt they were improving but still had 
some way to go. The need to formulate a robust strategy was linked by some 
members to this sense of developing capability. While historically it has been 
found that boards have not played a major part in strategy development (McNulty 
& Pettigrew, 1999), Ruigrok et al. (2006) confirmed the significance of board 
involvement in strategy as one of the key roles for the contemporary strategic 
board. The honest and insightful observation by the CEO relating to the level of, 
and motivation for, reporting at board meetings provided an additional element for 
consideration in the action research process.
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As noted earlier, this facilitated session was designed to establish the con-
text and allow issues to emerge. The session was supported by prior individual 
telephone interviews with board members, a face-to-face interview with the 
chairperson, and meetings with the CEO. It was from a combination of these 
methods that the issue, which would become the focus of the research interven-
tion, emerged.
The Emerging Issues for New Zealand Football
Of the six board members initially interviewed for background purposes, five 
noted the need for an articulated strategy. Interestingly, this aspect emerged as 
part of a series of background questions and not in response to a direct query 
about strategic board function. The first issue arose in a distinctly unique way 
from each of the five interviewees in response to a general question about the 
issues facing the organization. For example, one board member stated that, “The 
strategic plan needs to be documented and laid out and available to regions 
through online/e-mechanisms” (2d, 1 September 2005). Another noted that, 
“We’ve improved—but in the past we haven’t really looked ahead and if we 
could change that, it would be a massive leap forward” (2c, 1 September 2005). 
The link to strategic board function was confirmed in an interview with the CEO 
(23 August 2005) and at the facilitated board session (26 October 2005).
The second issue to emerge that would become an aspect of the research 
intervention, was also raised in individual interviews with board members. In one 
participant’s words: “We need a board that is not marching to the CEO or any 
other person’s agenda”. He emphasized that the board needs to ensure it is a gov-
erning board and not operationally driven. For him this meant a “board operating 
as being in charge . . . where the tail is not wagging the dog” (2f, 25 August 2005). 
In contrast, another board member felt that sometimes boards hide behind the 
word governance and do not become informed enough to govern. He considered 
there needed to be an overlap in management function and governance for the 
board. In his words, “We have been very much in the hands of the office . . . for 
the way the board operates” (2h, 29 August 2005). A third board member also 
expressed the view that: “NZF (board) takes the lead from the CEO, rather than 
the other way around” (2d, 1 September 2005).
An interest in the interaction between the CEO and board has been the domi-
nating topic for researchers in sport governance (Auld & Godbey, 1998; Hoye, 
2006; Hoye & Cuskelly, 2003a, b; Inglis, 1994, 1997b; Kikulis, 2000; Searle, 
1989; Shilbury, 2001). Referred to as “shared leadership”, these studies have con-
sidered the balance of influence and power between the CEO and board. Predomi-
nantly, the findings have noted increasing influence by the CEO. As exemplified 
by the NZF situation, understanding how shared leadership operates is crucial to 
developing the strategic role of the board. McNulty and Pettigrew’s (1999) con-
ceptualization of board involvement in strategy also addresses the balance between 
board and CEO influence. In applying their three-level model, noted earlier, it 
appeared that the NZF board may have been operating at both levels one and two. 
At level one, board influence occurs at the final approval stage and at level two, 
board influence occurs earlier in the decision process with board members offered 
the opportunity to shape ideas before they are presented by the CEO.
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In framing the issue with board members the researchers acknowledged the 
following conditions: that the NZF board appeared to have personnel who were 
strategic thinkers, skilled professionals and had a sound understanding of the sport 
and its environmental influences. In addition, the board was at the initial stages of 
designing and articulating its strategic priorities but was, at present, not following 
an agreed strategy. There was also some desire by the board members to seek a 
shift in dominance and leadership from the CEO to the board.
For the purposes of this research, the issue that emerged within the NZF case 
study was therefore articulated as: in order for the NZF board to develop its stra-
tegic capability, it needs to establish a frame of reference for the board to steer the 
organization. It also needs to consider the balance of leadership between the CEO 
and board and ensure board involvement in the forthcoming strategy. This articu-
lation of the issue was reaffirmed with the CEO in a meeting (2 October 2005). 
The next stage of the action research process was to create an intervention designed 
to address these issues and lead the board toward greater strategic functioning.
Phase Three: Intervention and Action
Throughout the eight month period identified as the intervention and action phase, 
multiple “mini-cycles” or iterations took place. The terms “intervention” and 
“action” have been carefully chosen to represent a distinction between researcher-
led steps (i.e., intervention) and participant-led steps (i.e., action). In some 
instances both terms are used together denoting integration between researcher-
led intervention and participant-led action. This is done to help clarify researcher 
and participant roles and to further aid transparency of the process and ultimately 
research validity. In utilizing these terms it is also made explicit as to why the 
interventions and action steps were designed, the major steps in implementation 
and the significant aspects of monitoring the process. In essence, “tentative expla-
nations are being formed as the story unfolds” (Coghlan & Brannick, 2001, 
p. 100).
A facilitated environmental analysis and strategy formulation workshop was 
the first major step in the intervention and action phase with the board. Led by an 
external consultant with input from the lead researcher, this workshop took place 
at the lead researcher’s home institution on 30 November 2005. At the commence-
ment of the session, the lead researcher asked the board and senior management 
present a series of questions regarding purpose and expectations of a strategic 
planning process. These questions and answers are summarized in Table 1.
An outcome of the environmental analysis phase of the workshop was the 
identification of eight “high priority challenges” facing NZF. As agreed by the 
group, these challenges needed to be addressed by the organization in light of its 
overall vision and mission. This was followed by an analysis of the organization’s 
internal strengths and weaknesses. Finally, by utilizing data from the internal and 
external environmental analysis, the group began to articulate objectives that would 
form the “strategic outcomes” and “strategic initiatives” sections of the plan.
The board and senior management appeared committed to the strategic plan-
ning process and were aware of its potential benefits. In particular, staff members 
were encouraged by board member comments relating to the intention by the 
board to “own the strategy” (2f, 30 November 2006). “This is a very positive thing 
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from our point of view” (senior staff member, 30 November 2006). Of signifi-
cance, were comments noted by board members indicating the centrality of the 
strategic plan to board deliberations. The researchers pondered why a strategic 
plan had not been developed already if it was considered so central to board deci-
sion making. Perhaps understanding this might assist in knowledge development 
in this important area.
The researchers also noted that once the context had been identified and the 
environmental issues articulated and prioritized, the identification of strategic 
objectives became straightforward. As the theorists assured “strategy is the match 
or interface between an organization and its external environment” (Hoye, Smith, 
Westerbeek, Stewart, & Nicholson, 2006, p. 70). “While a call to action is a natu-
ral inclination . . . many strategies can fail because . . . ‘advance’ work (i.e., a 
comprehensive review of the internal and external environments) has not been 
done properly” (Hoye et al., 2006, p. 75). The strategy emerging from the facili-
tated session appeared far more comprehensive and robust than earlier attempts by 
the board and CEO to identify priorities in the absence of context. In addition, in 
terms of the McNulty and Pettigrew (1999) model of board involvement in strat-
egy, it appeared the board was moving to embrace elements of level three.
A Second Intervention and Action Step: Agenda Redesign
Work by the CEO in completing the strategic plan continued and the lead researcher 
and CEO met on 27 January 2006 to discuss progress. Of particular interest to the 
lead researcher was the ongoing involvement by the board in the plan’s design. In 
response to a question regarding this, the CEO considered that “The board is all 
over this plan” (27 January 2006). The lead researcher and CEO also discussed 
the challenges noted above in aligning board discussion with strategic priorities. 
The CEO questioned how the strategic plan could be incorporated into board 
meetings. In drawing on work by Inglis et al. (1999) and Inglis and Weaver (2000), 
the lead researcher suggested the agenda could be restructured to represent the six 
“strategic challenges” emerging as the strategy areas that would lead to achieve-
ment of the overall vision. “Although agenda setting may be seen as a relatively 
routine matter, it may have profound influence on the quality of board delibera-
tions and outcomes” (Inglis & Weaver, 2000, p. 66).
As a next step, it was agreed that the CEO would seek board approval or 
“sign-off” on the strategic plan once finalized, and also redesign the agenda around 
the six strategic challenges set out in the plan. The lead researcher subsequently 
emailed the CEO a range of strategic plan formats as well as an example of an 
agenda designed around strategic priorities. This intervention resulted in a signifi-
cantly revamped agenda and papers for the next board meeting on 8 February 
2006. The 21 December 2005 agenda and accompanying board papers were 
largely set out as a reporting mechanism with significant emphasis given to finan-
cial reporting, subcommittee, advisory committee, and CEO reporting. By con-
trast, the revamped agenda and board papers for the February meeting placed the 
strategic plan at item six on the 13-point agenda, directly after technical matters 
such as apologies, minutes, and matters arising. This was followed by the six 
“strategic challenges” which were listed on the agenda as the six strategic priori-
ties for the organization.
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The accompanying board papers detailed the nature of these challenges, set-
ting out the desired outcome, who was responsible for what and a selected number 
of “strategic initiatives” detailing how the challenges would be addressed. This 
adjusted format for the board papers also allowed for a reporting section on the six 
priority areas providing the board with a summary of progress to date, the CEO’s 
opinion on specific issues and a simple indication as to whether the initiative was 
“on or off track.”
This design was further modified for subsequent board meetings (22 March, 
3 May and 26 July 2006). While the board papers for these later meetings reported 
on all strategic challenges/priorities (1–6), agenda items were more selective. 
Only those strategic initiatives considered by the CEO to require board discussion 
and decision were listed on the agenda. Of the 22 strategic initiatives detailed 
within the six challenge and outcome areas, the same five initiatives were listed 
for the March and May meetings. Three of those five items also appeared on the 
agenda for the July meeting.
Feedback from the board to the CEO regarding progress made in drafting the 
strategic plan was very positive. At the 8 February 2006 board meeting, one board 
member noted: “I see this strategic plan as a great advance and am very comfort-
able with the set up going forward” (2a). Another commented that “I’d like to 
strongly support x’s (CEO’s) initiatives. I think there is a great new feel within the 
organization (2b). Another member (2d) asked to whom the document should be 
made available and suggested it be circulated as widely as possible. The CEO 
advised that he “already had a great deal of positive comment . . . on the plan from 
presentations to stakeholders.”
The researchers observed that while similar items were discussed at the 
meetings before the agenda restructure and at the meetings following, the discus-
sion appeared more directed toward the strategic priorities. Inglis and Weaver 
(2000) found similar results in their research. They used a framework that struc-
tured the agenda into three areas: strategic activities, resource planning, and 
operations. In implementing and evaluating this new design with a nonprofit 
board, Inglis and Weaver found, “The framework used in this study is one way to 
help boards think strategically about their roles and how they can plan their work 
to fulfill their roles and responsibilities” (p. 76). They also noted that for each 
agenda item, an outcome of the discussion was identified. They considered this 
helped board members to understand the expectations associated with each 
agenda item.
In an e-mail exchange between the lead researcher and CEO following the 
February board meeting, the CEO asked: “How did you think the board meeting 
went today? I felt it was a good step-up in terms of quality strategic input. I have 
a few thoughts on how to refine it further and I am interested in your comments” 
(CEO, 8 February 2006). The lead researcher replied with a detailed e-mail within 
which she suggested framing questions and recommendations to direct board 
thinking so that members were aware of the CEO’s expectations associated with 
each reported initiative. The lead researcher also considered that providing recom-
mendations and questions could also stimulate more proactive board involvement 
in issues. “If this occurred and because you provide such good written reporting—
you could probably get away with less verbal reporting—allowing more time for 
board input” (13 February 2006).
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In providing feedback to the CEO on the draft strategic plan document, the 
lead researcher commented in her e-mail:
To me the strategic plan now seems to be derived from a clear articulation of 
the environmental conditions facing the sport plus it has succinctly identified 
the priorities over the next few years. Maybe at some stage you and the board 
need to agree on the priorities for this year. Given your energy, enthusiasm 
and competence, there could be a danger that, now you have the strategic 
plan, you will set about trying to achieve it all, now!! (13 February, 2006)
The lead researcher met again with the CEO two days before the next board 
meeting, scheduled for 22 March 2006. The CEO explained how he had chosen 
five strategic initiatives out of 22 for the board to focus on. In going through the 
agenda papers, the lead researcher asked what the CEO wanted from the board on 
each initiative in terms of discussion and decisions. This preparation process for 
board meetings, which usually occurred a week before the meetings, appeared to 
assist the CEO in clarifying ways to create a board environment conducive to 
strategic function. “Between your suggestions, and my ideas—building on prog-
ress thus far, I think the next meeting will be right on the strategic button” (CEO, 
personal communication, 16 February 2006).
The final steps in monitoring the intervention and actions that had taken 
place, was to observe subsequent board meetings and review the agenda papers 
and minutes (22 March, 3 May, 26 July 2006). The lead researcher noted in her 
diary regarding the 22 March board meeting that, “There seems to be much more 
input from board members and less from the CEO”. In terms of the reporting 
process one board member asked for more specific reporting on international 
activity so the board could be more informed in making future funding decisions 
(2f, 22 March 2006). Regarding the framework of the strategic plan, the CEO 
explained that “It feeds right through the board reports, it feeds right through staff 
work-plans, so everyone is now on strategy” (22 March 2006). There was positive 
feedback from the board regarding this alignment of strategic priorities.
However, in observing the July meeting, the lead researcher noted concern 
that the agenda structuring and reporting was perhaps not working as intended. In 
this meeting, there appeared to be significant emphasis on reporting and the meet-
ing format did not appear conducive to board decision making. The reporting, 
however, was now aligned with the agreed strategic priorities for the organization 
and as such still held a strategic purpose. The researchers wondered how much 
input there had been from the chairperson/and or board into the agenda restructure 
and reporting framework. The researchers also noted that it might aid board dis-
cussion if the expectations associated with each agenda item were outlined for the 
board. The evaluation of action and intervention (phase 4 of the research process) 
would provide greater insight into the outcomes of this process from the board’s 
point of view.
Phase Four: Evaluation of Intervention and Action
The evaluation phase focused on change and learning, elements noted by Coghlan 
and Brannick (2001) to be central to the action research process. The phase there-
fore sought to identify what had changed and what was learned within the NZF 
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organization setting, in relation to board strategic capability in general and the 
action and intervention in particular. How this process might take place was dis-
cussed with the CEO and it was decided that each board member would be con-
tacted for an evaluation interview. Drawing on questionnaires used by Inglis 
(1997b), Inglis et al. (1999), Inglis and Weaver (2000) and Shilbury (2001), a set 
of open-ended questions for board members and the CEO was designed based on 
three themes. First, there were questions relating to the perceived impact of the 
strategic plan and planning process on board strategic function. Second, there 
were questions regarding the perceived impact of the agenda changes and rede-
sign of board papers on board strategic function. Third, there were questions relat-
ing to perceived change in the balance of leadership between the CEO and board 
within the governance setting.
Impact of Strategic Plan and Formulation Process
On the whole, board members considered the development of the strategic plan to 
be a significant and positive change for the board. For example, one board member 
stated “having the strategic plan in place was great and a very positive thing” (2e, 
15 September 2006). “We’ve made huge strides in getting the strategic plan out” 
(2a, 7 September 2006). In particular, there was a sense that the plan now provided 
a context for board strategic discussion.
It gives a point of reference and makes it easier to relate issues back to the 
overall direction. We previously worried about operational stuff and now we relate 
those issues to strategy. Discussions were previously done in isolation, now we 
have a context (2c, 22 August 2006).
Another board member commented: “We now have more focus with a game 
plan” (2f, 11 September 2006). He explained that previously board discussion was 
more of a “scatter-gun approach that wasn’t giving us enough focus. Now a spe-
cific focus has been achieved (2f)”. Similarly, a different board member stated 
that, “We know what we want to do long term now” (2h, 31 August 2006). The 
CEO’s comments regarding the impact of the strategic plan in terms of providing 
focus and context were consistent with the board consensus. “Now they’ve got a 
framework . . . a context. It has allowed us to review our priorities and to maintain 
them . . . We know what we are trying to achieve, we now can make decisions” 
(5 December 2006).
Board members and the CEO were also asked whether their strategic priori-
ties for NZF had changed as a result of the strategic planning process. To assist 
in this, interviewees were asked to compare current priorities with a list gleaned 
from interviews in August 2005. Three board members emphasized strongly that 
the financial viability of NZF was not captured as a priority at that time. “My 
number one is not mentioned, that is, that we are financially solvent” (2h, 
31 August 2006). In reference to this, another board member stated, “Sustain-
ability of the game/financial security needs to be added” (2f, 11 September 2006). 
A third said “I would add: to be financially viable—to continue to generate 
income streams. It’s very revealing that this was not on the original list. I think 
we took it for granted” (2e, 15 September 2006).
Another point raised, was the progress made in establishing a shared confi-
dence in the new strategy. In particular, the CEO noted the value of formally 
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assessing the environmental conditions as adding to the credibility of the plan-
ning process. “Having stepped back from the process, I can see that it gives us 
more confidence in the strategy . . . it grounded it” (5 December 2006). He also 
noted that “it has given us a degree of credibility externally.” This can be con-
trasted with a statement made by a board member before the facilitated environ-
mental scanning session: “We’ve got all the great ideas but we need to be 100% 
confident in our strategy” (2f, 26 October 2006). Within the evaluation inter-
views, there were also a number of statements made by different board members 
that indicated confidence in the new strategy. “Because we all did it together, 
everyone had buy-in. We couldn’t say this isn’t my plan. By going through the 
process we have aligned our views” (2c, 22 August 2006). “We are now all sing-
ing from the same song sheet in terms of what we want for the game” (2a, 
7 September 2006).
With regard to the process of formulating the strategic plan, some board 
members noted change in both individual and collective strategic thinking. “For 
me, the exercise of creating the strategic plan forced me to think long term. I 
enjoyed the process of going through it. It helped my thinking and I think it forced 
us to question what we thought were priorities (2c, 22 August, 2006). Another 
board member considered that the “facilitated sessions gave us some real focus on 
strategic priorities . . . we did a lot of strategic thinking then.” (2f, 11 September 
2006). However, two board members also noted that since the formulation phase, 
there has been some regression in terms of board strategic thinking noting that 
“there is a gap now. We need to get back to reviewing strategic decisions. . . . 
We’ve taken our eye off the ball since” (2f, 11 September 2006). Another noted 
“Initially, yes the strategic plan did help me focus on strategic issues—but we 
have since lost our way” (2e, 15 September 2006). For one board member, there 
was no change in strategic thinking as a result of the strategic planning process. “I 
don’t think a hell of a lot has changed” (2h, 31 August 2006).
Based on evidence from the evaluation interviews, there appeared to be an 
important change in the way the CEO and all but one of the board members viewed 
the strategic functioning of the board. By developing the strategic plan collabora-
tively, there appeared to be a greater “collective sense” of strategy rather than the 
individual views previously held. In conjunction with this shared notion of strat-
egy there also appeared to be a sense of confidence in the newly articulated strat-
egy and in future decision making. The strategy, derived from an environmental 
assessment and subject to a formulation process that most considered robust, pro-
vided a context and reference point for strategic decision making. As a conse-
quence, the comments regarding board strategic function that came from the 
evaluation interviews contrasted strongly with those made a year previously by 
board members.
Impact of Agenda Changes. The second major objective of the evaluation 
phase was to examine the impact of changes to the agenda structuring and associ-
ated board papers on board strategic function. There were mixed views regarding 
the extent this change had aided the board’s ability to function strategically. The 
CEO considered that the agenda restructuring created, “a significant change that 
allowed priorities to come up each time” (CEO, 5 December 2006). However, 
some board members interviewed noted some apprehension. “Sometimes there is 
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still too much information and sometimes it’s a bit confusing. I would like the 
agenda and reporting developed into a variance report so that we can see the 
evolving story” (2a, 7 September 2006). Another board member stated:
It needs to be de-cluttered. There are too many issues in front of us. We need 
to have the overall statements on our agenda so that we can be reminded of 
our vision etc at each meeting—we need a one pager in front of our face each 
time. In essence, we need to have the board papers fit with our overall puzzle 
so that as a board we are dealing with the big issues and we also need to 
include an integration of our financial position. (2e, 15 September, 2006)
Another board member also considered that the financial reporting needed to 
be better integrated into the reporting on strategic priorities. “We needed to match 
the money side up in the reporting process” (2h, 31 August 2006).
In addition to these concerns, there was also affirming comment from board 
members about the agenda changes in relation to board strategic function. In con-
sidering how the strategic plan could remain a dynamic document, one board 
member stated that, “the structured format provides more opportunity for us to 
question it (the strategic plan) . . . and how the priorities might move up and down 
the list” (2f, 11 September 2006). In relation to the board papers and CEO report-
ing against the strategic priorities, the board member also considered that “as the 
data comes through, it helps us make decisions” (2f, 11 September 2006). How-
ever, this board member also cautioned against a total acceptance of the CEO 
reports as the only version of the organization’s performance. “A big problem 
could be accuracy. The value of our discussion is based on the data we receive.” 
In adding to the list generated before the research intervention of a strategically 
capable board, another board member made a similar observation in noting that 
the board, “needs full knowledge of what’s going on and not just rely on informa-
tion given to them” (2h, 31 August 2006).
The CEO also noted the significance of the information put before the board. 
When asked what he had learned regarding board strategic capability, the CEO 
replied: “If you give them detail—you’ll get detail back. If you give them a stra-
tegic framework—you’ll get strategic discussion” (CEO, 5 December 2006). 
Another board member considered the change in agenda format had strengthened 
the strategic focus of the board. “We spend more time looking forward now at the 
priorities we have identified and this is because of the agenda re-structuring” (2c, 
22 August 2006). This board member also considered that “the meetings were 
now geared towards the plan and because of that there is much more focus to the 
meetings”. Another board member concurred: “There is now a linking of his (the 
CEO’s) reports to strategic initiatives” (2a, 7 September 2006). On an individual 
level, this board member explained that he had “learned more about strategic 
focus—you need to be structured and focused—you can’t be ad-hoc” A third 
stated that “There has been a subtle change in the way meetings are run. This is a 
shift more toward a board of governance rather than a board of management” (2f, 
11 September 2006).
The differing views from board members regarding the agenda changes were 
somewhat perplexing. It demonstrated there was still some way to go to achieve 
“a process for ensuring the organization’s purpose, desired strategic outcomes 
and values are constantly kept ‘in the frame’ and relevant” (Sport & Recreation 
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New Zealand, 2006, p. 62). In comparing the agenda documents before and after 
the research intervention, there is clearly a change to the format that reflects the 
newly established strategic priorities. However, as evidenced above, at least two 
board members considered the agenda and corresponding papers still needed to 
be “de-cluttered”. In their view, the overall picture needed to be more evident and 
there needed to be a stronger integration of their financial position and reporting 
of budget variance within the board papers.
Some progress had been made regarding the integration of the strategic plan 
into regular board meetings thus creating a better strategic focus. However, it 
appeared further steps were still required to satisfy all board members. Poten-
tially, the concerns noted by board members regarding the sustainability of the 
strategic priorities could be addressed through a more effective design of board 
agenda papers as suggested above. Certainly, one of the learning areas noted by 
the CEO and board members was the significance of the board documentation 
(prepared by the CEO) in shaping board strategic focus. Hoye and Cuskelly (2007) 
also make this point in their assessment of how well boards engage with strategy. 
Drawing on an empirical study undertaken by Bart and Deal (2006), they noted 
that “board members spend time discussing whatever information is placed before 
them, rather than discriminating between important and trivial issues” (Hoye & 
Cuskelly, 2007, p. 114–115). In the CEO’s words: “I have a greater understanding 
about what being a strategic board is about. It’s about what you provide them with 
and what you expect from them” (CEO, 5 December 2006).
Change to CEO-Board Shared Leadership. The third objective of the evalua-
tion phase was to examine the impact of development of the strategic plan and 
agenda redesign on the CEO-board dynamic in terms of shared leadership. Board 
member comment on this in the evaluation interviews was consistent across the 
group with the exception of one board member. For the majority of board mem-
bers, there was little doubt the strategic plan and agenda redesign had significantly 
contributed to a shift in the balance of influence from the CEO to the board. “We 
are more autonomous now. We aren’t led by the CEO as much as we used to be 
which is a good thing” (2c, 22 August 2006).
Another board member considered that the, “board has become more involved 
in strategic decisions. We are more privy and know where we are going.” (2a, 
7 September 2006). This board member also stated that “without the strategic plan 
we left the initiative to management . . . we left it too much to management before, 
to decide on the priorities”. Another board member stated that “The board through 
this process has taken more leadership through the chair” (2f, 11 September 2006). 
On an individual level a board member stated that “Being more involved and 
knowing more has helped me to strategize better. I’m more thoughtful about it” 
(2a, 7 September 2006). In a follow up e-mail, a board member confirmed: “The 
board has stepped up in terms of exerting its influence” (2f, 13 November 2006).
Couched within the context of the financial difficulties experienced by the orga-
nization, another board member considered in a more general sense the following:
Boards do hang off and when they do come in and are assertive, they are not 
welcome. The financial issue has meant the board has had to step in. SPARC 
has revved us up and the board has revved up x (the CEO). (2e, 15 September, 
2006)
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In considering the increased influence of the board, this board member also 
noted that the balance of shared leadership had, “potentially swung too far” in 
favor of the board (2e, 15 September 2006). The board member used the meta-
phor created in the first facilitated session that described a strategically capable 
board as operating within an expansive green field—a wide-open space with 
broad limitations—like a “paddock with boundaries” (26 October 2005). Now, 
this board member considered the paddock had become too large and that the 
board “needs to bring a few fences in. Even though we love that paddock being 
big . . . the fences have been thrown open and the horses have been let go.” This 
was an aspect also noted by the CEO. In considering possible change to the bal-
ance of influence, the CEO considered that the, “pendulum has swung back and 
forward regarding the financial issues. It’s about finding the right position” 
(5 December 2006).
One board member had an even more extreme perspective on the impact of 
the strategic plan and agenda changes on the balance of board-CEO shared 
leadership:
The CEO has become much wider in his sphere of activity and the board 
would know less about what’s going on. Everything is reported somewhat 
differently than what it was—because of strategic plan . . . X (the CEO) now 
reports to the strategic plan. It has put even more reliance on the CEO. . . . He 
(the CEO) was instrumental in the plan and execution. Some strategies have 
gone ahead without worrying about the money. (2h, 31 August, 2006)
The difficult financial environment could have created a magnified perspec-
tive for this particular board member, who was more closely involved in the finan-
cial aspects of the organization. However, other board members also noted the 
importance of following up the expansive strategy development process with 
agreed operational detail and limitations, particularly financial. “The financial 
control has not been there because we got used to an x (previous CEO) . . . We 
need to be cognizant of the CEO’s style and be clear of the expectations . . . (2e, 
15 September, 2006). A further board member stated that “The strategic plan hasn’t 
set limits . . . we are currently writing the delegated authorities” (2a, 7 September 
2006). “We need policies and procedures in place irrespective of the person . . . 
(2e, 15 September, 2006). Similarly, two other board members stated: “The priori-
ties are very vague—we need to make sure they progress” (2c, 22 August 2006). 
“There are gaps in the operational side which supports the plan. This needs to be 
developed so that our influence is clearer” (2f, 11 September 2006).
In terms of other future actions to create greater influence on the board’s 
behalf, one board member stated “We should have time on our own, without the 
CEO. We are still influenced a lot by the CEO—it’s hard not to be—he knows the 
day to day detail” (2c, 22 August 2006). Three board members considered that the 
board should meet more regularly and that greater utilization of board subcom-
mittees would enhance board influence (2a, 2c, 2h). Significantly, one board 
member stated, “I thought you could influence decisions more than you can” (2c, 
22 August 2006).
Based on the evaluation interviews, there are strong indications that a shift 
toward greater board influence had occurred. Previously, board members had 
described the relationship in such terms as the “tail wagging the dog.” However, 
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from the number of comments made regarding possible improvements, it appeared 
the board wanted to increase its influence still further. It also appeared the board 
was conscious of too much involvement and encroaching on the CEO’s opera-
tional domain.
Achieving the optimum balance in shared leadership was perhaps not some-
thing this board had yet achieved. It did appear that the board had gained an 
increased understanding of what it means to be strategic and considered them-
selves to have “stepped up” in terms of strategic influence aided by the strategic 
plan. However, there were indications that a potential impact of the strategy 
process had created a situation where an unchecked CEO could possibly take too 
much initiative. In this situation, there was a lag between the expansive “blue 
sky” visioning of the strategy formulation process and corresponding controls 
such as CEO delegated authorities and an implementation plan. The organiza-
tion was also facing a financial short-fall which impacted on future initiatives. 
Consequently, the board responded with a “heavier hand” than it may have pre-
ferred in addressing the financial difficulties. The sequence of these events 
appeared to create an insightful learning environment for both the researchers 
and participants. “I thought it was down to the people but you have to have pro-
cesses in place so that the legacy can carry on” (2e, 15 September 2006). I’ve 
learned that I need to stop and think, am I being operational or strategic? I’m 
much more conscious and aware of when you’re slipping into operational” (2f, 
11 September 2006).
It was apparent to the researchers that the board and CEO had greater insight 
regarding how they could go about achieving an optimum balance in influence 
and why they had found themselves in an environment where the CEO had domi-
nated. “There was no strategic plan. The board meetings were about the CEO 
reporting. . . . When I came on board, I just followed the same format. . . . Now 
they’ve got a framework” (CEO, 5 December 2006). From the view of a board 
member “We needed, as a board, to speak with one voice. We needed, as a board, 
to ask for more (2e, 15 September, 2006). In a follow up email, the board member 
explained there was “An inability to really drive a new plan at any earlier time due 
to the lack of consensus . . . with the CEO” (2e, 9 November 2006). An under-
standing of how the plan had become a tool for greater board influence and, poten-
tially, consensus with the CEO was experienced. Similarly, there also appeared to 
be an awareness of the significance of the CEO’s preparatory board documents, 
his potential to direct board meetings as a consequence, and the impact that an 
imbalance in shared leadership might have on board strategic function.
Conclusions: Synthesizing the Research Outcomes
This concluding section draws together the salient insights detailed in the results 
and discussion section. By employing specific theoretical concepts, it also dem-
onstrates how outcomes from the fieldwork contribute to theory relating to board 
strategic function. The action research program with NZF allowed an unprece-
dented level of access to a setting often highly guarded. As a result, a unique 
opportunity to extend theoretical notions of shared leadership, board involve-
ment in strategy, and board strategic function was created. The research program 
also provided the opportunity to consider the utility, within the NSO governance 
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context, of the broad theories that underpin these concepts. Agency, stewardship, 
and managerial hegemony theories were used to establish the framework for this 
study and while each have contributed to ideas explored; stewardship theory has 
the most potential to frame the complex dynamics of this case study. As noted 
earlier, a steward’s behavior is based on co-operation, pro-organizational, and 
collectivistic actions. These elements are precisely those needed to create an 
environment where the board can become more involved in strategy and can 
share the leadership function with the CEO. Findings from this study which link 
board-CEO shared leadership with enhanced board strategic capability therefore 
establish that stewardship theory can also serve as an underpinning idea for the 
development of strategic capability within the governance setting.
In terms of the more specific theoretical concepts of shared leadership and 
board strategic function, Hoye and Cuskelly (2007) considered a central issue for 
sport organizations is the need to clarify roles of the board and staff in all of the 
strategic activities undertaken. They also claimed that there remains a need to 
gather more empirical evidence about the relationship between volunteers and pro-
fessional staff leadership roles and how the dynamics of these relationships influ-
ence board and organizational effectiveness. Sport and Recreation New Zealand 
(2006) also maintained that the board-CEO relationship is full of contradictions. 
They noted that while it is the chief executive that is expected to “make things 
happen,” and often lead a volunteer board, the chief executive’s only authority is 
granted by the board.
This case study also demonstrates a dynamic and complex relationship 
between the board and CEO which, if unexamined, may result in impaired stra-
tegic capability on behalf of the board. The leadership paradox referred to by 
Shilbury (2001) and described by Sport and Recreation New Zealand (2006) may 
help to explain why the board found it difficult once the agenda changes were 
instigated. The increased collaboration between the board and CEO in develop-
ing the strategic plan should have led to increased shared leadership. Paradoxi-
cally, however, a confounding view could be that while the board felt greater 
ownership of the strategy, they also noted a lack of control, particularly in rela-
tion to the activities of the CEO. A further issue was the reports being produced 
by the CEO and the board’s reliance on this information. If left unchecked, even 
within the framework of an agreed strategy, this situation in which the board 
appears to be “stepping up” has the potential to create a new set of challenges for 
the board.
As noted earlier, the volunteer nature of board members may also have con-
siderable impact on the board’s ability to influence and control. Conclusions from 
this study indicate that boards need to become more involved in the strategic 
development of the organization, however, becoming more involved means a 
greater demand on their time, expertise, and intellectual commitment. As noted in 
the case of the football board, most had considerable experience and education 
relevant to their positions as directors. Despite this and by their own admission, 
members still struggled with the increasing level of sophistication being intro-
duced by the CEO as part of the strategic capability building process.
Being voluntary, there are significant limitations on the time and focused 
attention individuals can offer. Herein lies the paradox, board members are ulti-
mately responsible for organizational outcomes yet have limited involvement and 
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therefore, potentially, control. The voluntary model does not necessarily allow for 
boards to have full access to information from a range of perspectives that would 
allow for fully informed decision making. Furthermore, as the football directors 
found, the more complex the information provided, the greater the need became 
to “de-clutter” the agenda papers. This seemed to create greater reliance on the 
CEO and on his ability to distil and summarize information for the board. Due to 
the limitations of volunteer involvement, the CEO remains the pivotal “player” 
who controls the flow of information to the board and, indeed, also has the oppor-
tunity to control the strategic functioning of the board. In a situation where the 
CEO has a different perception of financial risk to that of the board, for example, 
this could be problematic.
Sport and Recreation New Zealand (2006) suggested that these contradic-
tions can only be resolved when the CEO and board work as a team. Putting 
aside for the moment the dilemma regarding the limitations of volunteer time 
and expertise, the work of McNulty and Pettigrew (1999) provides a conceptu-
alization of board involvement in strategy. In so doing, it provides a basis for 
considering how the board and CEO might further work together. McNulty and 
Pettigrew found that board behavior in shaping the content, context, and conduct 
of strategy and helping to create an environment for strategic debate was “the 
deepest form of part-time board member involvement in strategy” (p. 56). 
Figure 2 sets out a continuum of board involvement in strategy that extends 
McNulty and Pettigrew’s (1999) conceptualization of this dynamic by adding 
two further dimensions.
Figure 2 — Continuum of board involvement in strategy.
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The continuum builds on the notion that the board is and should be involved 
in shaping strategy, and, according to McNulty and Pettigrew (1999), challenges 
previous research outcomes regarding managerial hegemony on boards. In pro-
moting the benefits of increased collaboration, the continuum is further expanded 
to include board/CEO coleadership of strategy development where there exists 
full collaboration between the two. The final extension is where the board contin-
ues its collaborative approach with the CEO to codesign board processes that use, 
monitor and sustain the jointly developed strategic priorities. This outcome also 
confirms the findings of Inglis and Weaver (2000) in designing agendas to assist 
boards to think strategically about their roles and upon which the second iteration 
of this action research process was founded.
Indeed, findings from this research indicate that the further along the collab-
orative continuum the board and CEO position themselves, the more opportunity 
the board will have to perform its strategic functions. The assumption is that 
should a further step occur, where the board overly dominates these processes, the 
optimization of this dual leadership dynamic will decrease. In this situation, the 
CEO might not be an active partner in designing the strategic priorities and might 
only be responsible for implementation and performing an administrative func-
tion at board meetings. This is not considered a desirable situation. In this concep-
tualization of board involvement, there is no question of the need to have the CEO 
also fully engaged.
This extension of McNulty and Pettigrew’s (1999) thinking on board 
involvement in strategy also applies to the model presented by Nadler (2004). 
Nadler promoted a middle position in terms of the level of board involvement in 
strategy and one that he calls “value-added engagement”. In this approach, the 
CEO leads and develops the plan with input from the directors. Nadler (2004) 
also noted that the challenge is for the CEO to develop ways to engage the board 
in the “right kinds of work—and in the right way” (p. 25). Outcomes from this 
research indicate that the challenge would also be for the board and, in particu-
lar, the chairperson to take equal responsibility in developing processes that 
engages the board in the right kind of work. The learning from this research may, 
therefore, provide some clarification of the evolving role of the board. In simple 
terms, if boards are to become more strategic in their approach, they need to 
become more involved in core strategic functions that include not just establish-
ing strategy but collaborating with the CEO in board processes that focus the 
board on those priorities.
In explaining the leadership paradox that emerged from his study, Shilbury 
(2001) questioned whether the redefinition of board roles (in favor of greater CEO 
control) might be the first signal of genuine cooperative power between the board 
and CEO. “This redefinition might signify a less visible role performed by the 
board in establishing and maintaining direction for the organization” (p. 276). 
Certainly, outcomes from the current study have led the researchers to promote 
the benefits of greater cooperation between the two parties. However, the notion 
that an NSO board may need to be a full and visible partner in the functions noted 
above to further develop its strategic capability, is a key contribution to this debate. 
Figure 2 demonstrates the evolution of the board’s increasing involvement in 
which the first three steps, articulated by McNulty and Pettigrew (1999) are drawn 
from a corporate, “for-profit” context.
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In considering both for-profit and nonprofit organizations, Bart and Deal 
(2006) asserted “That a board should be an active participant in an organization’s 
direction setting activities is rapidly declining as a matter for speculation and 
debate” (p. 3). Like most contemporary thinking, Bart and Deal considered that 
an “organization’s strategy is one of the most important activities that a CEO and 
his or her executive team can perform” (p. 3). To what extent the board could or 
should actively participate is, of course, situational. Nonetheless, the continuum of 
involvement perhaps challenges boards and CEOs, in whatever context, to consider 
whether greater collaboration than their current situation might produce a more 
capable strategic board. One would suspect that many could well benefit from a 
shift to the right.
While greater collaboration might mean a better understanding by the board 
regarding its strategic function, it may also mean greater commitment, time and 
expertise. This has implications for current expectations of volunteer board 
members and most particularly the contribution of the chairperson. However, 
there are benefits in the knowledge that in order for boards to become more stra-
tegic, they need to become more involved. Figure 2 sets out what “more involved” 
means and the steps a board might need to undertake to be fully collaborative. 
Like the collaborative approach to action research, there are profound benefits 
from full involvement in decisions and actions, but this may not always be logis-
tically possible or appropriate. However, the conceptual shift from the idea that 
the CEO should lead strategy development with some board involvement (Nadler, 
2004) to striving for a truly shared situation may bring greater rewards for board 
strategic capability.
What remains unanswered is how the present sport governance model that 
draws on part-time volunteers, can be reconciled with greater board involvement 
and increased responsibility and control. Certainly, clearer role definition regard-
ing the expectations of board members will help so that from the outset, sport 
directors are recruited on the basis of performing time consuming and complex 
strategic functions. Perhaps in the future, the chairperson in particular and board 
members in general may need to be compensated for their expertise and time so 
that the transformation from an amateur to a professional operating environment 
within national sport organizations may be further advanced.
Implications for Practice
In breaking down the theoretical outcomes from this research, the first implication 
for board members is the need to consider their balance of involvement in strat-
egy. In practical terms, the use of Figure 2 allows the board to place itself along 
the continuum and to consider the implications of this positioning. By undergoing 
such a process the board can more readily identify whether it needs to become 
more involved and whether that involvement can be sustained by integrating strat-
egy into board processes.
Making expectations explicit and collectively agreeing on the board’s 
involvement in strategy may alleviate any confusion within the boardroom set-
ting regarding the role of the board. Although not fully explored in this study, the 
role of the chairperson in leading this process is also an important consideration 
for practitioners. Similarly, the role of the CEO in strategy development needs to 
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be clearly defined, and negotiation of the collaborative effort must be an ongoing 
focus. As established by this study, at the same time as engaging in strategy 
development and partnering with the CEO, the board needs to be aware of main-
taining its other functions, particularly the CEO monitoring role. Partnering and 
performance managing the CEO are part of a potential leadership paradox high-
lighted by this study. In practical terms, the way the board maintains ultimate 
control and responsibility over the activities of the CEO, while also collaborating 
with him/her, needs to be carefully considered.
Similarly, the process by which the board receives information about the per-
formance of the organization from the CEO and, as noted above, board involve-
ment in “keeping the strategy alive” may also create a leadership paradox. 
Governance practitioners need to be alert to this potential paradox and establish 
methods and processes for working through any challenges that such inconsisten-
cies might create.
Further Research
This research has explored how boards of national sport organizations can develop 
their strategic capability by becoming, in this case, more involved in strategy. In 
addressing the research question, the study has also raised a number of further 
questions. In particular, the role of the chairperson in board strategic capability is 
an area of research that warrants further investigation. Although not fully explored 
within this study, there were indications that probing the responsibilities of the 
chairperson in, for example, agenda setting and board shared leadership would 
further add to our understanding of strategic capability. Further research could 
clarify the role of the chairperson in relation to the role of other board members 
within these areas. In addition, to further the work of Hoye (2006), investigation 
of the dyadic relationship between the chairperson and CEO and how these two 
individuals share leadership in strategy development and board processes is also 
recommended.
Related to the above is the need to further the action research process in terms 
of the success of greater board collaboration in the integration of strategy into 
board processes. As Nadler (2004) found, “By participating in the process, the 
strategy becomes ‘our’ strategy as opposed to ‘their’ strategy. With increased 
ownership comes increased commitment to help the strategy succeed and to 
defend it when under attack” (p. 28). A further action research project to test 
greater board involvement in the processes that would use, monitor, and sustain 
the strategic priorities has the potential to contribute to the understanding of the 
shared leadership dynamic developed by the current study.
Another unanswered question raised by this research is how the present sport 
governance “model” that draws on volunteers can be reconciled with the need for 
greater board involvement and increased responsibility and control. Future 
research needs to investigate the impact of this change in expectation on the role 
of the board and determine ways that increased responsibility might be integrated 
into board function. There is the potential to expect more from voluntary board 
members than is realistically possible under the present system. Creative solutions 
to this problem are needed and are well suited to the action research approach 
Developing Board Strategic Capability  275
where possible solutions could be “tested” as part of the study. In particular, the 
tension between involvement in strategy formulation and performing a monitor-
ing function as well as the level of operation knowledge required is a recom-
mended area for further research.
In conclusion, this study found that board strategic capability, in the case of 
NZF, is enhanced by greater board involvement in strategy thus creating greater 
demands on voluntary personnel. Being a board member of a national sport 
organization is a challenging role requiring high level skills and capabilities. In 
striving to become more strategically orientated, the demand on individuals to 
cope with the increasing complexities is ever growing. Sport organizations in 
New Zealand are fortunate to have volunteers of such caliber taking on these 
responsibilities. It is hoped that research studies of this nature will continue to 
contribute to the understanding of this important and demanding role so that 
sport organizations may prosper as key social institutions within our society.
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